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When the planning commission and the zoning board flit about
sprinkling little golden showers here rather than there, they
make millionaires of some and social reformers of others.1
INTRODUCTION
The legal literature and the legal profession are finally beginning to
come to grips with the obvious fact that land use planning decisions do
not take place in a vacuum. A similar awakening is taking place in the
field of taxation." It is becoming apparent that neither property taxes nor
land use planning are hermetically sealed, but each has spillover effects
on the other field.4
This belated awakening has brought to the surface what was known
for a long time to speculators and investors: governmental decisions in
the field of zoning, subdivision regulation, capital expenditures, trans-
portation planning, and other areas have a profound effect on land
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1. Gaffney, Contaimnent Policies for Urban Sprawl, in APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF
URBANIZATION 114, 124 (R. Stanber ed. 1964).
2. See, e.g., Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CI. L. REV. 681, 691-711 (1973).
3. See, e.g., D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
344-67 (1971); G. PETRsoN, A. SOLOMON, H. MADJID & W. APGAR, PROPERTY TAXES,
HOUSING AND THE CITIES (1973).
4. See, e.g., Property Taxation, Effects on Land Use and Local Government Revenues,
Prepared for Subcornnz. on Intergov. Rel. of the S. Conmi. on Gov. Op., 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (Comm. print 1971); D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 32-40, 129-36
(1966); Lefcoe, How Taxes Affect Urban Design-And How to Make Them Do a
Better Job of It, 4 REAL EST. L.J. 244 (1976); Stocker, Effects of Taxation on Urban
Land Use, 39 APPRAISAL J. 57, 62-66 (1971); Zimmerman, Tax Planning for Land Use
Control, 5 URBAN LAWYER 639 (1973).
After this Article was written, a substantial contribution to the literature on the
subject was published that indicates the continuing interest in the field. Currier, Ex-
ploring the Role of Taxation in the Land Use Planning Process, 51 IND. L.J. 27 (1975).
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owners. 5 Some decisions create wealth overnight; others destroy eco-
nomic values. Because these phenomena were not officially recognized in
the past, the windfalls enriched the few, frequently at the expense of
taxpayers at large, while the destructions of value were borne solely by
the hapless land owners.
A growing body of literature has discussed these phenomena since
their recognition. Some commentators have proposed methods of recap-
turing for the public treasury the windfall benefits caused by changes
in the law or by public improvements.6 These advocates generally do
not recognize any particular responsibility to the victims of govern-
mental decisions that have wealth-destroying aftereffects. 7 The opposite
approach, adopted by advocates of curtailed governmental activity
in land use planning, would require compensation in most cases
of wealth impairment, but would still leave "windfalls" to enrich the
favored few.8 Finally, some writers have devised methods of bringing a
measure of justice into the area that would mitigate both the unearned
increments and the fortuitous wipeouts that are incidental to govern-
mental activity.9
One governmentally induced phenomenon that has a spillover effect is
upzoning.1° It generally is assumed that upzoning increases the value of
land; this may be true for those who hold unimproved or minimally im-
proved land, which can be improved readily or disposed of for improve-
5. See, e.g., d'Arge, Economic Policies, Environmental Problems, and Land Use, in
ENVIRONMENT: A NEW Focus FOR LAND-USE PLANNING 157 (D. McAllister ed. 1973);
Levi, Some Econonic Implications of Land Use Plaming for Real Estate Owners and
Investors, 43 APPRAISAL J. 363 (1975). For a nontechnical discussion that may overstate
the point see Balk, Invitation to Bribery, HARPER'S, Oct. 1966, at 18.
6. E.g., Comment, Betterment Recovery: A Financial Proposal for Sounder Land Use
Planning, 3 YALE Rzv. OF L. & Soc. AcTioN 192 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75, 82-85 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 699-705; Gramm & Ekelund, Land-Use
Planning: The Market Alternative, 43 APPRAISAL J. 562 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Acconnnodation Power: Antidotes
for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 1021 (1975).
There is also a growing body of literature on how to anticipate and capitalize on
governmental activity. See, e.g., M. SELDIN, LAND INVEsTMENT 109-11, 137-51 (1975).
10. "Upzoning" is a change in zoning classification from less intensive to more
intensive; "downzoning" refers to the opposite phenomenon. The change may be in
the use (e.g., from single family to multiple residential use), bulk (e.g., from 15,000 sq.
ft. minimum lot size to 7,500 sq. ft.), or height (e.g., from 30 ft. maximum height to 60
ft. maximum); occasionally upzoning may involve all three elements. Upzoning is most




ment. In many cases, therefore, the enrichment may accrue to individuals
who, in anticipation of governmental action, withheld their land from
development. These landowners are being rewarded financially for be-
havior that, although economically beneficial to the individual, is not
beneficial to the community. Less obvious is the effect of upzoning on
landowners who developed their land to the full extent permissible under
the prior, more restrictive regulations. Their plight is presumably quite
considerable; saddled with improvements that might prematurely become
obsolescent and that will face competition from more efficient units sim-
ply because of the changes in the law, these landowners may be harmed
by the increase in value of the land. Owners of improved property can-
not benefit immediately from its increased value and presumably will
have to pay additional real estate taxes after the land is reassessed follow-
ing upzoning.
This scenario is the one usually found in law review articles,1 based on
abstract reasoning. Although the conclusions are logical and probably
true, it would be beneficial and instructive to test them by a field study.
Additionally, some recently developed legal concepts, if consciously
applied to the problem of upzoning, may serve to reduce the increment
of value to the property owner who held his land for development, while
decreasing the burdens on the property owner who contributed toward
the orderly development of the community through improvement of his
or her land.
Before setting forth the methodology and results of the study under-
taken for this Article, a discussion of these emerging legal concepts is
necessary. From this discussion, the Article proceeds to a brief summary
of the zoning laws of a particular state to set the study within its legal
framework and to illustrate the applicability of the results to the coun-
try at large. Finally, based on the findings of the study, recommendations
are developed that should be useful in injecting a measure of fairness
into the effects of upzoning.
TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
Starting in the early 1950'S,12 and increasing in intensity in the 1960's,"3
widespread dissatisfaction was voiced with the rigidities imposed by
11. E.g., Comment, Bettc-rment Recovery: A Financial Proposal for Sounder Land
Use Planning, 3 YALE REv. OF L. & Soc. ACTION 192, 193-94 (1973).
12. Note, Building Size, Shape, and Placement Regulations: Bulk Control Zoning Re-
examined, 60 YALE LJ. 506 (1951).
13. See, e.g., O'Harrow, Zoning: What's the Good of It?, in 2 TAMING MEGALoPoLIs
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euclidean zoning.14 This criticism extended to all three basic elements of
zoning ordinances: use, bulk, and height. Writers criticized absolute
height limitations coupled with set-back, side-yard, and back-yard
requirements as means of controlling bulk and density, and objected to
rigidities imposed by bulk regulations on a lot-by-lot or parcel-by-parcel
basis. In response to these criticisms, experimentation with different ap-
proaches was undertaken.
The major innovation in bulk controls in residential areas was the
introduction of the concept of planned unit developments by which
bulk and density regulations were applied to large areas rather than to
individual lots.15 This gave the developer added flexibility to mold a
livable community and either to preserve open lands in a natural state or
to create recreational facilities not otherwise easily available. 6
For areas zoned commercially, and particularly for downtown areas
of large cities, the concept of bulk regulations based on a floor-area ratio
(FAR) was developed. 7 The traditional method of bulk regulation by
means of required setbacks and side-yards coupled with a maximum
height leaves very little room for ingenuity or creative approaches. For
instance, it does not lend itself readily to the construction of office or
residential towers surrounded by attractively landscaped plazas that
760 (H. Eldredge ed. 1967); Reps, Requiem for Zoning, in 2 Taming Megalopolis
746 (H. Eldredge ed. 1967); von Eckardt, Well Meant Zoning is a Plague on Our
Society, Washington Post, Oct. 9, 1966, § G, at 11, col. 1. For a study of Houston, the
largest unzoned city in America, see Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAW &
EcoN. 71 (1970). But cf. Lilley, In Defense of Zoning, 42 APPRAISAL J. 596 (1974).
14. Until quite recently many courts and writers equated euclidian zoning with zon-
ing. E.g., Rockhill v. Township of Chesterfield, 23 N.J. 117, 127, 128 A.2d 473, 478-79
(1957); Morris, Toward Effective Municipal Zoning, 35 WASH. L. REv. 534, 535-36
(1960).
15. Direct bulk regulations result in indirect density regulation. See generally
Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73 HARV. L. REV.
241 (1959). Symposium, Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 3 (1965). In
this connection the Federal Housing Administration developed a rather sophisticated
system to measure the intensity of use, known as land use intensity rating. For a dis-
cussion of the concept see URBAN LAND, vol. 22, Oct. 1963, at 1; id., vol. 28, Nov. 1969,
at 3.
16. Theie is some question whether these desired results have been achieved. See,
e.g., Babcock & Bosselman, Conflicts in Land Use, in ENVIRONMENT: A NEW Focus
FOR LAND-USE PLANNING 143, 146-7 (D. McAllister ed. 1973).
17. For a description of the FAR concept see D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 111 (1971); PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF URBAN
PLANNING 429-31 (W. Goodman & E. Freund eds. 1968); E. ROBERTS, LAND-UsE PLAN-
NING 4-111 to 4-121 (1971); Williams, Recent Decisions in Planning Law: 1966, 33
A.I.P.J. 184 (1967); Note, Building Size, Shape and Placement Regulations: Bulk Control
Zoning Reexamined, 60 YALE L.J. 506, 518-19 (1951).
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leave more open space and enhance aesthetic qualities of the area. To
accommodate such projects, New York 8 and other cities have experi-
mented with new approaches to commercial zoning.
The FAR Concept
The basic FAR concept is simple, establishing a relationship between
total land area and total floor space. Thus, under a FAR regulation of
1:1, a developer could build a one-story structure covering the whole lot,
a two-story structure covering half of the lot, or a four-story structure
covering a quarter of the lot. The maximum height of any building
would depend on whether FAR is introduced in its pure form or is
coupled with an absolute height limitation; minimum setbacks might also
be included to prevent construction to the lot line. In downtown areas
of large cities the FAR ratios may be 10:1, or even 20:1.
FAR has been adopted in the zoning regulations of downtown areas of
most major cities in the country. 9 Few decisions have dealt directly with
the validity of FAR, but when the validity of the concept has been at
issue, it uniformly has been sustained.20 This is not surprising; once the
proposition is accepted that the bulk of buildings and the intensity of use
may be regulated, the means to accomplish this end should be left to
legislative discretion.
After this basic approach of FAR had been worked out, some planners
broadened their thinking. With the experiences of planned unit develop-
18. Apparently New York City has experimented with the concept since 1940. See
Note, Building Size, Shape, and Placement Regulations: Bulk Control Zoning Re-
examined, 60 YALE L.J. 506, 518 n.50 (1951).
19. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW 689, 711-14 (1974); 4 id. at 281-3
(1975).
Detroit is a notable exception to this trend. The city has foregone the adoption of
FAR regulations because they were deemed inappropriate to the downtown area.
Apparently the Director of Plannnig was of the opinion that there should be a rela-
tionship between the height of a building and the width of the abutting streets. Thus
the concept was not implemented because of Detroit's narrow streets. See Canevaro,
The Detroit Public Center & Public Center Area: Mandatory Design Review & Control
Over Building Bulk, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND EcONOMIC CON-
CEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 181, 183-84 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970).
20. Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d 767,
427 P.2d 810, 59 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1967); People ex rel. Interchemical Corp. v. Chicago,
29 Ill. 2d 446, 194 N.E.2d 199 (1963); Woods v. City of Newton, 351 Mass. 98, 217
N.E.2d 728 (1966);Pondfield Road Co. v. Village of Bronxville, 141 N.Y.S.2d 723
(Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd mcre., 1 App. Div. 2d 897, 150 N.Y.S.2d 910, aff'd mem. 1
N.Y.2d 841, 135 N.E.2d 725, 153 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1956); Village of Bronxville v. Francis,
206 Misc. 339, 134 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, I App. Div. 2d 236, 150 N.Y.S.2d
906, aff'd mere., 1 N.Y.2d 839, 135 N.E.2d 724, 153 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1956).
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ments and bulk regulations on an area basis as a background, planners
began to ask whether a similar approach could be applied to downtown
business areas. In other words, rather than enforcement of bulk regula-
dons on a lot-by-lot basis in neighborhoods that were likely to be divided
into many small holdings, optimum densities for an entire downtown
area conceivably could be established, without necessarily enforcing uni-
formity on all parcels. Thus, if the past history of a lot or the economic
plans of its present owner had preserved part of the FAR allotment of
that parcel of land, perhaps another parcel could exceed its share with-
out doing violence to the plan. Secondary considerations, such as the
preservation of open spaces and historical landmarks, played a role in the
development of these ideas as they were translated into concrete pro-
posals21 and, in turn, into legislative enactments. 22
Transferability of FAR Allotments
Property, in the legal sense of the term, is a purely mental concept
consisting of a rather complex bundle of rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities. 3 It has been the genius of the common law to strive for
maximum flexibility of the incidents of ownership, thus permitting an
owner almost unlimited means of separating, transferring, rearranging,
and reassembling the constituent parts of the bundle. These divisions can
consist of separate parts of the bundle held concurrently by two or more
persons24 or of undivided interests in the whole bundle, or in some desig-
21. See, e.g., J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT-LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE MARKET-
PLACE (1974); Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use
Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 35 (1974); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning
and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REv. 574 (1972); Costonis,
Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Morris,
Air Rights are "Fertile Soil," I URBAN LAWYER 247 (1969); Morris, "Zoning Inagina-
tion"-Diensional Zoning, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 679 (1972); Pedowitz, Transfers of
Air Rights and Development Rights, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 183 (1974); Shales,
The Economics of Development Rights Transfers, 42 APPRAISAL J. 526 (1974); Report,
Zoning: Air Lot Regulation/Title Insurance, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 260 (1970).
22. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-48.2-I to -48.2 7 (1973); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL
CODE, ZONING ORDINANCE, ch. 194A, art. 3.2 (1970); NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLU-
ToN art. I, ch. 2, § 12-10, art. VII, ch. 4, §5 74-79 to -792 (1971); SEATTLE ,VASH.,
ZONING & PLANNING CODE § 26.34.080; Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance No. 145,043, Sept. 7,
1973.
23. These terms are used in the Hohfeldian sense. See W. HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (V. Cook ed. 1919).




nated portion, apportioned among two or more owners.2 They can
involve divisions of the whole bundle, or parts of the bundle, into suc-
cessive time periods.26 These divisions can be spatial ones, with separate
interests carved out above, below, and on the surface2 7 Finally, limited
interests in one parcel of land can be carved out for the benefit of
another.28 Thus, although certain writers seem to believe that the concept
is new and startling, representing a break with traditional property law,29
it has long been recognized that an owner may transfer individual inci-
dents of ownership from the complex bundle that his property comprises.
With this background, it is not surprising that the FAR allotment of
a particular parcel can be looked upon as yet another stick in the bundle.
The owner of land to which a FAR allotment has been made may be
given a choice of either developing his property to the legal limit or of
transferring his allotment to another owner of property in the same zone,
who then could develop his own land in excess of its allotment.30 This is
not an all-or-nothing approach; on the contrary, it permits anything
between the absolutes, with the owner deciding how much of the allot-
ment to use and how much, if any, to transfer. The result is not unlike
that achieved by easements for light and air, which by agreement limited
the development potential of one parcel for the benefit of another; these
25. These undivided interests are tenancies in common, joint tenancies, and tenancies
by the entirety.
26. Thus, the fee may be subdivided into life estates, remainders, executory interests,
or reversions.
27. Mineral fees are well known to the law of mining. See, e.g., 3 RoCKY MOUNTAIN
MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 15.13 (1960). Similarly, the
"upper chamber" concept that a room could be owned apart from the building goes
back at least to the reign of Elizabeth I and the practices of the Middle and Inner
Temple Inns of Court. See R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 67-71 (1967).
28. This refers to such interests as easements, covenants, and profits a prendre.
29. Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The
Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BL'FALo L. REV. 77, 85-91 (1974); cf.
Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Acconrmodation Power: Antidotes for the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controveries, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 1021, 1061-62 (1975).
30. Developments in land use planning and its implementing legal tools are very
rapid. Although the concept of transferable development rights was started in down-
town sections, it is now being transplanted into residential settings to preserve open
spaces in suburban development. This approach is used by the city of Livermore,
which is located in the San Francisco Bay area, some 30 miles southeast of Oakland.
See Note, Development Rights Transfer in Livermnore: A Planning Strategy to Con-
serve Open Space, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 191 (1975). It also has been attempted in
Southampton Township, Suffolk County, New York. Chavooshian & Norman, Transfer
of Development Rights: A New Concept in Land-Use Managemvent, 43 APPRAISAL J.
400, 403 (1975). Further, it has been used in Pierce County, Washington. Interview with
Mr. William LeDrew, Assistant Planner, Pierce City, Washington.
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distributions of property owners' rights historically have been recog-
nized and their implications appreciated for the purpose of valuation.3
For the municipality, the owner, and the developer, such an arrange-
ment is attractive because it permits the maximum development compati-
ble with the master plan. The developer may be able to maximize his
returns by buying additional FAR allotments, up to the total allowable,
and constructing a larger and economically more attractive project. The
owner who is unable or unwilling to develop his property to the full
legal potential under its allotment may sell the excess, thereby realizing
the economic potential of the property and insuring that in the future
he will not be taxed on values he is not utilizing.3 2
For society at large the arrangement may permit the preservation of
certain noneconomic values that otherwise would have to yield to the
pressure of property taxes and other market place determinants.33 The
amenities to be preserved by transferable FAR allotments are usually
listed either as private open spaces in high density, high land value areas, 34
or as historical and architectural landmarks. 35 The success of these at-
tempts, however, is doubtful at present. 36
31. See, e.g., Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
32. For a discussion of taxation of air rights that present similar problems of non-use,
see, e.g., Comment, Tax Liability of an Air Rights Conveyance, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 285
(1974). Cf. Macht v. Dep't of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972), discussed
in Comment, Taxation of Easements in Airspace, 33 MD. L. REv. 159 (1973).
33. See, e.g., J. CosToNis, supra note 21, at 6-11; Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incen-
tive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. Rav. 574, 579-84
(1972).
34. See Report of New York City Planning Commission, No. 224, Dec. 7, 1972,
dealing with the preservation of private parks in Tudor City. But see Fred F. French
Investing Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Supp. Ct.
1973). For a comprehensive discussion, compare Marcus, Mandatory Development
Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks,
24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77 (1974), with Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable
Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975). See also 4 N. VILLAMS, AMERICAN
PLANNING LAW 274-77 (1975).
35. As Professor Costonis points out, certain innovative zoning techniques, such as
the zoning bonus system, render uneconomical small parcels on which landmarks are
typically located. J. COSTONIS, supra note 21, at 10. But see Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 2353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 1975) (attempt to
preserve Grand Central Station). Cf. Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35
N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Developmnern Rights, 84
YALE L.J. 1101 (1975). Despite its broad title, the note is concerned only with the
validity of such transfer rights in connection with an attempt to preserve open spaces
and historical or architectural landmarks. These issues, although very interesting, are
not directly involved in this Article.
At the national level there are proposals pending to solve the historical preservation
[Vol. 17:701
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Newport Associates, Inc. v. Solow
The only reported decision dealing directly with the transfer of unused
FAR allotmentsO7 is Newport Associates, Inc. v. SoJow.38 The plaintiff
in Newport Associates had leased to the defendant an improved parcel
of land in downtown Manhattan; the building on this lot did not exhaust
its current FAR allotment. The defendant lessee was also the owner in
fee of two adjoining parcels of unimproved real estate. The two lots
owned by defendant in fee and the third leased by him constituted a
zoning lot, as defined by the New York zoning resolution.2 9 The long-
term lease between the parties had a minimum term of 21 years that
could be extended by the exercise of successive options to a total of 99
years." The defendant decided to improve his two fee lots with a 45-
story office building that would have exceeded the FAR allotments for
those two lots alone. The building, however, would have been well
within the bulk regulations if the unused FAR allotment of the leased lot
could have been incorporated. The city building department issued a
building permit to defendant that incorporated the "borrowed" allot-
ment from the leased premises; this action was challenged by the lessor
on the ground that the lease did not include a transfer of unused develop-
ment rights. The lessee counterclaimed for an adjudication that its "bor-
rowing" of the unused allotment was valid.4'
Although the successive courts litigating this dispute disagreed as to the
issue by income tax benefits. S. 667, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), H.R. 6225, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). However, as former Internal Revenue Commissioner Mortimer
Caplin warned at a tax policy forum sponsored by the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, such approaches will not be successful unless they are supplemented by
appropriate zoning and planning. DAILY TAX REPORT, Feb. 5, 1976, at G-5 to -6.
37. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d
762 (Sup. Ct. 1973) and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 43 U.S.L.W.
2523 (N.Y.S. Ct. Feb. 25, 1975), involved the validity of a grant of transfer rights as
compensation for the denial of the right to develop or redevelop the property.
38. 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
931 (1973).
39. NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. 1, ch. 2 § 12-10(c) (1971), defines a
zoning lot as "[a] tract of land, located within a single block, which . . . is designated
by its owner or developer as a tract all of which is to be used, developed, or built
upon as a unit under single ownership . . . ." The section further provides that, "[f]or
the purposes of this definition, ownership of a zoning lot shall be deemed to include
a lease of not less than 50 years duration, with an option to renew such lease as to
provide a total lease of not less than 75 years duration." See SEATTLE, WASH., ZONING &
PLANNIXG CODE § 26.34.080. For a discussion, see Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New
York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 372 (1971).
40. 30 N.Y.2d at 267, 283 N.E.2d at 602, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
41. Id. at 266, 283 N.E.2d at 601, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
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proper disposition, they all assumed without any discussion that the
transfer of unused FAR allotments was valid. The trial court had sus-
tained the contentions of the defendant on the ground that under the
zoning ordinance the defendant was "the owner" of the "zoning lot."
The court reasoned that, for purposes of the issuance of the building
permit, full dominion was exercised over both the fee lots and the leased
lot.4 2 This was reversed, per curian, by the appellate division, which
granted summary judgment to plaintiff.43 On appeal to the court of
appeals, the judgment of the appellate division was reversed and the
order of the special term was reinstated.
In disposing of the plaintiff's contention that a valuable property
right was being taken from it, the court of appeals reasoned that pur-
suant to the provisions of the ordinance the lessor was not treated as
owner of such development rights and, therefore, was not deprived of
anything.4 4 The court based its determination on the long-term nature
of the lease. Although it is true that as long as the lease is in good stand-
ing the lessor has not been deprived of anything, the court overlooked
several contingencies.
It does not require a great deal of expertise in real estate development
to know that large commercial structures are constructed primarily with
borrowed funds.45 Therefore, it is safe to assume that the 45-story office
building to be constructed would be encumbered by a large mortgage.
Both mortgages and leases occasionally fall into default; if several years
after the completion of the project the defendant owner-lessee were
economically unable to fulfill its obligations and defaulted on both its
lease and its mortgage, the single ownership of the "zoning lot" would
be severed as a result of a mortgage foreclosure sale and repossession of
the leased premises by the lessor. The purchaser at a foreclosure sale
42. Id. at 267, 283 N.E.2d at 602, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
43. 36 App. Div. 2d 519, 317 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1971).
44. "But [plaintiff's argumentl overlooks the fact that, in view of defendant's owner-
ship of the adjoining building, his lease from plaintiff and the Zoning Resolution itself,
plaintiff possesses no such right of sale. There is nothing in the ordinance which treats
its reversionary interest as ownership for the purpose of floor area ratios or air space
rights . . . ." 30 N.Y.2d at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 602, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
45. For example, there is a trend toward longer maturities and higher loan-to-value
ratios of such loans. R. FISHER & B. OPPER, MORTGAGE COMMITMENTS ON INCOME
PROPERTIES: A NEW SERIES FOR 15 LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES, 1951-70, at 43, charts
3-4 (1973).
For a discussion of leveraging and of the difficulties recently experienced by operators
of commercial buildings in New York City, see Meyer, Leveraged Losses-Real Estate




would acquire a larger building than the land he purchased would justify,
a benefit to which he otherwise would not be entitled. At the same time,
the lessor would recover less than the totality of the property rights it
transferred upon the execution of the lease. Property rights, therefore,
would be taken from the lessor without any compensation.
it is regrettable that the attorney for the plaintiff did not raise, and
the courts did not discuss, these potentially serious problems. Although
many of these difficulties may be obviated if the transfer of the excess
development rights is made by a voluntary agreement between the par-
ties, either in the form of a sale or a lease, for which an appropriate con-
sideration is paid, it would behoove draftsmen of leases and ordinances
alike to consider the possibility of default.
The Uses of Transferable Development Rights
Assuming the validity of transferable development rights, questions
arise concerning possible uses. The first and foremost use, of course, is
that of density controls applied on an area-wide basis. Although questions
have been asked about the validity of density controls and about what
constitutes acceptable density,46 it is evident that the density of an
area, present or prospective, has a direct impact on many municipal
decisions. Planning for transportation needs, infrastructure, and municipal
services obviously is concerned in part with densities. Therefore, what-
ever optimum is established for acceptable density, any kind of municipal,
public, or even private planning has to take it into accountY
Once this primary objective was accepted, writers immediately pro-
posed the use of transferable development rights for all manner of
secondary purposes. It was suggested that these rights could, and should,
be used to protect architectural landmarks, 48 urban parks,49 open areas,"0
phosphorescent bays,"' and anything else that the imagination of writers
in the field could suggest. It is not always clear from these articles
whether the authors refer to the transfer of excess FAR allotments or
46. See, e.g., Babcock & Bosselman, Conflicts in Land Use, in ENVIRONMENT: A NEW
Focus FOR LAND-USE PLANNING 143, 146 (D. McAllister ed. 1973). This article, however,
speaks about residential areas.
47. But cf. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 769 n.291.
48. See generally J. CosTo.is, supra note 21.
49. Marcus, Mandatory Del elopnent Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The
Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 77-79 (1974).
50. Note, Development Rights Transfer in Livermore: A Planning Strategy to Cort-
serve Open Space, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 191, 192-93 (1975).
51. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE LJ. 75,
91-95 (1973).
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whether they speak of the acquisition or transfer of scenic easements or
similar interests.52 Less publicized, but also advanced, were more ques-
tionable applications, such as an attempt to stave off the financial crisis
of New York City by the sale of additional transferable development
rights from municipal buildings. 3 Recently, doubts were cast on the use-
fulness of transferable rights in some of these contexts.54
It has been suggested recently that transferable development rights
could play a role in adjusting social burdens in the gray area between the
police power and the power of eminent domain. 5 Traditionally, these
two powers have been treated as if they were completely separate; 5
under the police power, no compensation is required, but when property
is taken under the power of eminent domain, the owner must receive just
compensation. In fact, however, there is a continuum between them;
the dividing line is not clear. The shadowy distinction between these
powers has been perceived in a few contexts in which, by legislative fiat,
compensation has been provided, although from a traditional point of
view no "taking" has occurred because the regulatory measure does not
exceed the limits of the police power.5 7 In this setting the availability of
transferable rights may provide the means for a modicum of adjustment
without simultaneously imposing impossible burdens on already depleted
local treasuries.
52. For a discussion of scenic easements and similar interests limiting the develop-
ment potential of land without reference to zoning, see, e.g., Krasnowicki & Paul,
The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1961);
Rose, A Proposal for the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights as a
Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 635, 646-48 (1974).
53. Professor Ellickson reports that New York City leased excess transferable de-
velopment rights applicable to the appellate division courthouse for 75 years. Ellick-
son, supra note 2, at 703 n.78. See also Note, Development Rights Transfer in New
York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 358-61 (1972).
54. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J.
1101 (1975); cf. Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE LJ.
338 (1972).
55. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021, 1061-81 (1975).
56. See 1 P. NiCHors, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42[21 (3 ed. J. Sachman ed. 1973);
Kucera, Eminent Domain Versus Policy Power-A Common Misconception, 1959 INST.
EMINENT DOMAIN 1; cf. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssuE (1973).
57. See, e.g., Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (1970). Similarly, some courts are beginning to
reject an all-or-nothing approach, e.g., Brown v. Tahoe Reg' Plan. Agency, 385 F.
Supp. 1128, 1132 (D. Nev. 1973).
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THE LAW OF WASHINGTON
To increase the understanding of the significance of transferable
development rights, an extensive study of a particular zoning case was
undertaken. But before discussing the methodology of the study under-
taken for this Article it is necessary to put the study in its proper legal
setting: the law of planning, zoning, and real estate assessments in the
State of Washington.
Washington Law of Planning in a Nutshell
In any discussion of planning and zoning by Washington municipali-
ties, a distinction must be made between charter cities and all other
municipal corporations58 Charter cities derive their powers directly from
the state constitution 59 and can enact zoning ordinances before the
legislature passes enabling legislation. 60 Furthermore, the passage of a
comprehensive state statute does not deprive such cities of their indepen-
dent powers as long as they do not elect to come under its provisions.",
As a result, Seattle and other charter cities in the state are undoubtedly in
a position to enact ordinances authorizing transferable development
rights, 2 and could adopt the recommendations set forth in this Article
without any state enabling legislation. This, however, is not true of many
other municipal corporations.
In recent years, Seattle and other charter cities have been responding
to increased demands on the planning process and public reactions to its
operation by making structural changes. The most important of these was
the creation in Seattle of a Department of Community Development,s
58. For general discussions which are now primarily of historical interest, see Morris,
Toward Effective Municipal Zoning, 35 WASH. L. REv. 534, 543-49 (1960); Trautman,
Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 WAsH. L. REv. 743,
765-83 (1963).
59. WASH. CONsr. art. XI, § 10, amend. 40. For a general discussion of home rule
or charter cities see, e.g., Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule
Since the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1975); Vanlandingham,
Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269 (1969).
60. Nelson v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 862, 395 P.2d 82 (1964).
61. Id. at 867, 395 P.2d at 84.
62. SEArn.E, WASH., ZONING & PLANNING CoDE § 26.34.080. Copied from New York
City, the Seattle plan permits a transfer to an adjoining parcel only: "However, for
the purpose of computing the gross floor area ratio adjacent properties and properties
located across an abutting alley, under common ownership, or linked for this purpose
by appropriate legal agreements and deed restrictions, may be considered together ...."
The ordinance fails to define the appropriate legal agreements.
63. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance No. 97473, Feb. 13, 1969.
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which superseded the prior planning commission and absorbed within it
many other functions. Similarly, to streamline administrative adjudica-
don and to make it fairer and more responsive, the city adopted a hearing
examiner process.64
Serious doubts long existed concerning the power of municipalities
other than charter cities65 to plan and zone. 6 These doubts were the
result of "Dillon's Rule," 67 which requires the powers of municipalities
to be construed narrowly.68 To clarify the matter and to put the planning
and zoning powers of municipalities on a firm footing, the legislature
adopted an enabling statute69 based on the Model Planning Act.70 Al-
though this act is not an exact copy of the model statute, it parallels it
rather closely, providing for the formation of planning commissions, 71
the undertaking of planning studies,72 the development and adoption of
comprehensive plans, 73 as well as the preparation and adoption of zoning
ordinances, 74 subdivision regulation ordinances, 75 and official map ordi-
nances.7  The recommendations made in this Article could not be
adopted by noncharter Washington municipalities subject to Dillon's
Rule without amendments to the enabling statute.77
64. Id. No. 102290, June 21, 1973.
65. See WASH. CoNsr. art. XI, § 11.
66. "While the power of charter cities to zone was established, this court had con-
sistently held that the powers of other cities and counties were to be narrowly con-
strued. The doubts as to the power of such municipal units to zone were expressly
disposed of by the enactment of RCW 35.63." Nelson v. Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 862, 867,
395 P.2d 82, 85 (1964).
67. The rule is named after its formulator, an early commentator on the law of
municipal corporations. See 1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS 448-51 (5th ed. 1911).
68. For examples of this adoption see, e.g., City of Aberdeen v. Nat'l Surety Co.,
151 Wash. 55, 275 P. 62 (1929); Farwell v. City of Seattle, 43 Wash. 141, 86 P. 217
(1906).
69. Wash. Sess. Laws [1935], c. 44. The act, as amended, is codified in WASH. REV.
CoDE ANN. §§ 35.63.010 to .120 (1965).
70. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Standard City Planning Enabling Act (1928).
71. WAsH. Rav. CODE AN'i. § 35.63.020 (1965).
72. Id. § 35.63.060.
73. Id. §535.63.090 to .100.
74. Id. §5 35.63.080 & .110.
75. Id. § 35.63.080.
76. Id. § 35.63.110.
77. Those municipalities that elect to come under the provisions of the Optional
Municipal Code and whose land use planning is, therefore, governed by WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. ch. 35A. 63 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974), might be able to do so, however.
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The Washington Assessment Process
The Washington Constitution provides for the imposition of tax rates
on assessed valuation of both personal and real property.7" This valu-
ation was to be 50% of fair market value. In implementing these pro-
visions, the legislature has directed that land and improvements be as-
sessed separately.79 Not surprisingly, for many years this constitutional
provision was not closely followed. 80 Thus, for instance, the 1966 aver-
age assessment ratio for all taxable property in King County was about
23.7 percent of market value, and in Snohomish County it was 19.1
percent.8 ' In a taxpayer action brought against the assessors of King
and Snohomish Counties in 1969, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that the constitutional provision was mandatory, leaving no room
for discretion, and ordered an immediate compliance with the provi-
sion. 2 The precipitous attempt by the county assessors to comply with
the order of the court accounts for the almost uniform 100 percent in-
crease in assessed valuations between 1966 and 1971.83 The constitution
was amended in 1972 to provide for a 100 percent assessment. 84
In 1955, the legislature, endeavoring to improve the assessment prac-
tices in the state, passed a statute that required all property in each
county to be reassessed at least once every 4 years.85 The validity of such
cyclical reassessment practices was approved by the supreme court of the
state on pragmatic grounds.8 6 At least in King County, however, because
of the number of parcels involved and budgetary and personnel limita-
78. WASH. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2, amend. 17.
79. WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 84.40.030 (1962): "In assessing any tract or lot of real
property, the value of the land, exclusive of improvements, shall be determined; also,
the value of all improvements and structures thereon . .. "
80. In this respect Washington was typical of the nation as a whole. Shannon,
Conflict Between State Assessment Law and Local Assessment Practice, in PROPERTY
TAXATiON USA 39 (R. Lindholm ed. 1967); U.S. BnREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATis-ITcA
ABsTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 428-29 (93d ed. 1972).
81. Carkonen v. Williams, 76 Wash. 2d 617, 623, 458 P.2d 280, 284 (1969).
82. Id. at 626, 458 P.2d at 285-86. See also Snohomish County Bd. of Equalization v.
Dep't of Revenue, 80 Wash. 2d 262, 493 P.2d 1012 (1972); State ex rel. Barlow v.
Kinnear, 70 Wash. 2d 482, 423 P.2d 937 (1967).
83. See appendices IV and V infra.
84. WASH. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2, amend. 55; see Dep't of Revenue v. Hoppe, 82 Wash.
2d 549, 512 P.2d 1094 (1973). The 1975 assessment figures were not used in this study
because that was the first year for which the new rules were applicable. WASH. REV.
CoDE ANN. § 84.40.030 (Supp. 1974).
85. Id. § 84.41.030.
86. Carkonen v. Williams, 76 Wash. 2d 617, 630-34, 458 P.2d 280, 288-90 (1969).
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tions, the 4-year cycle was never achieved and the county operated on
a 6 to 7-year cycle.8 7
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
Objective of the Study
The objective of the study explicated in this Article was to test em-
pirically whether upzoning would be followed by tax increases because
of reassessment of the parcels involved, particularly where market re-
sponses would not seem to justify such increases. The problem, of course,
was to try to separate the inevitable increases in value caused by factors
unrelated to zoning, such as persistent inflation, from those that were
solely or primarily caused by changes in zoning classification. Of par-
ticular interest were any data that might indicate whether a change in
assessment would follow if sales and development, failing to take advan-
tage of the more intensive use permitted by the upzoning, indicated that
the upzoning was premature, illjudged, or the result of overly optimistic
projections. If statistically significant changes could be established under
such unlikely circumstances, a strong nexus between changes in zoning
and assessment levels would be demonstrated.
Area Involved
For purposes of the study, a well-defined, limited geographical area
in a representative metropolitan setting was needed. Furthermore, the
area had to be transitional in the sense that, although upzoning had
occurred relatively recently, the new zoning classification had been
recognized by the tax assessor in the periodic reassessment process. Addi-
tionally, to test the hypothesis, the area needed to have a mixture of
undeveloped and underdeveloped land.
The city of Seattle was chosen for several reasons. Seattle has a popu-
lation of more than 500,00088 and constitutes the central city of an ex-
87. Id. at 622, 458 P.2d at 284. For this reason there was no reassessment of the area
involved in this study from 1958 to 1966. See appendices IV and V infra.









panding metropolitan area of close to 1.5 million persons.89 Its size falls
into the middle range of American cities and, although the community
has many, if not most, of the usual problems associated with urbaniza-
tion, such problems are not as yet unmanageable. Seattle, therefore, is
representative enough to allow application of the findings to both smaller
and larger communities.
The specific area within the city of Seattle chosen for purposes of this
study is known as the Denny Regrade and is located to the northwest of
the downtown business center." This area was selected because of its
interesting and somewhat unusual history,91 its immediate proximity to
the downtown area, and its appropriate characteristics. These include the
large amount of land on the regrade that was undeveloped or under-
developed and the recent upzoning of part of the regrade, done close
enough to the present to be representative but nevertheless already
reassessed,92 and not followed by large scale development. Finally, the
regrade itself is again in a state of transition, and interesting new plans
are being developed for its future by the Seattle Department of Com-
munity Development. 93
Because Seattle is situated on a number of hills, some of them quite
steep, the number of level building sites is limited. One of those hills,
Denny Hill, named after an early Seattle pioneer, was situated directly
to the northwest of the developing downtown area. For a time in the
89. The Seattle-Everett Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (an urban area of






This, however, does not give a complete description. Seattle is located in King
County, and Everett is located in Snohomish County. Portions of these two counties
form the Seattle-Everett Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Tacoma, which ranks
84th among the standard metropolitan statistical areas, is located in Pierce County,
immediately south of King County. These three counties account for more than half
of the state's population.
90. For the location and characteristics of the Regrade, see appendices I and II infra.
91. See DEP'T OF COMMUNITY DEvELOPMENT, CITY OF SrATrLE, DE.NY REGRADE Da-
VELOPMENT PLAN 4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as REGRADE PLAN]; N. Jones, SRATr=n 19-20,
201-02 (1972).
92. The upzoning under srudy took place in 1966. The reassessment of the entire
area involved in our study occurred in 1958, 1966, 1971, and 1973.
93. See REGRADE PLAN, supra note 91. For a short description and critical comment,
see Smith & Brewster, A Wise, Improbable Plan to Upgrade the Denny Regrade,
ARGus, vol. 82, May 16, 1975, at 1.
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late 19th century it was an exclusive residential area. With the growth of
the community, however, the demand for level land increased and prop-
erty owners petitioned for the removal of the hill. In 1906, the City
Council passed an ordinance authorizing the regrading of 77 acres;"4
this work was done between 1908 and 1911. Initial regrading left a part
of Denny Hill still standing, but many considered it an unnecessary bar-
rier. In 1926, a further ordinance was passed authorizing additional
regrading,95 and the balance of the hill was removed by 1930.
The completion of the regrading coincided with the beginning of the
Great Depression. As a result, the-anticipated construction boom did not
materialize. By the time construction started again in earnest at the end
of World War 11, technological changes caused the central business
district to expand vertically rather than horizontally. This accounted in
part for the lack of large scale development on the Regrade. The other
major factor inhibiting development was that a great deal of the land in
the area has been held by a single family.9" In anticipation of ever-rising
land values, part of this land was deliberately withheld from the market.
In the late 1940's, one high rise residential development, the Grovenor
House, occupying an entire block, was built in the northwest periphery
of the Regrade. This structure still stands out today and is a noncon-
forming use in bulk and height. Nothing of comparable bulk was added
during the 1950's; in the mid 1960's two 12- or 13-story office buildings
were constructed in the portion of the regrade closest to the central busi-
ness district. This, of course, does not mean that no other construction
took place in the area in the intervening years; to the contrary, many
structures were built between 1945 and the 1960's. Most of these, how-
ever, were low rise structures and did not represent an intensive use of
land.
Today the Regrade is a mixed area; approximately 35 percent of the
usable land is vacant, utilized primarily for parking lots and used car lots.
Of the remaining developed acreage, nearly half of the improvements are
reaching the end of their economically useful lives and, in most cases, do
not warrant rehabilitation.97 Most of the more recent construction does
not make intensive use of the land. In the opinion of a prominent Seattle
appraiser, the area involved in the study has uniform characteristics and
94. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance No. 13776.
95. Id. No. 50890, May 3, 1926.
96. Information based on the author's interview with Ms. Barbara Dingfield, Seattle
Department of Community Development, Oct. 23, 1975. Ms. Dingfield was Project
Manager of the Denny Regrade Development Plan.
97. REGRADE PLAN, supra note 91, at 5.
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the same highest and best use. 8 Virtually all of the area is zoned in a com-
mercial classification; 9 the differences in zoning relate primarily to height
and bulk rather than to use. Therefore, the changes in zoning deal with
relatively few variables and facilitate evaluation of the raw data.
Tbd Procedure
Rezoning of part of the Regrade took place in 1966.100 The change
was from a general commercial (CG) classification to a metropolitan
commercial temporary (CMT) classification. There is a slight differ-
ence in uses permitted under CG and CMT, but the overlap is large
enough to indicate that the use change is not the crucial factor. Changes
in the bulk and height classifications are more drastic. The CG zone had
an absolute 60-foot height limitation on buildings. On the other hand, a
CMT zone treats bulk classification on the FAR principle allowing a
10:1 ratio excluding accessory parking. Neither zone requires any set-
back lines for commercial and industrial uses.
An example may illustrate the consequences. In the CG zone a building
of a maximum of six stories can be constructed, assuming an average
of 10 feet per floor. This, of course, would include any ancillary off-
street parking facilities incorporated into the building. In a CMT zonei
however, a commercial building covering the entire lot could be ten
stories, or approximately 100 feet high, excluding parking facilities which
could add two or three floors. Therefore, a 20-story tower with one-half
lot coverage could be built on a base of three or four stories having
parking and other ancillary uses for a total of 23 to 24 floors.
For purposes of comparison, a control area that remained in the CG
classification was selected immediately to the northwest of the rezoned
area. Both visual observation and block-by-block comparison of the
characteristics and improvements found in the records of the assessor of
King County indicated that the two areas were fully comparable. Al-
though the control area is admittedly smaller than the rezoned or
noncontrol area, it is compact, contiguous, and large enough for
comparison. 1' 1
98. Interview with Falker Junglov, S.R.A., President, Seattle Chapter #20, Society of
Real Estate Appraisers, Feb. 23, 1976.
99. For the zoning classifications of the Regrade, see appendix IIL The rezoning of
the Regrade to the CG classification took place in 1957. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance
No.
100. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance No. 94606, Apr. 9, 1966.
101. For the identification of both the noncontrol and the control areas, see appendix
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After the noncontrol group and the control group were identified,
the assessment cards from the office of the assessor for King County for
each parcel of land within both groups were assembled. Both the non-
control and the control areas were reassessed in 1958, 1966, 1971, and
1973.1°2 From this raw data the relative changes in assessed valuation
of land were compared. The results were double checked in an interview
with the personnel of the assessor's office to establish whether the office
consciously had used zoning classifications as one of the elements
in determining assessed valuation; 103 the zoning classification was con-
firmed to have been a criterion employed in arriving at the valuation.1 4
The Findings'05
The appendices to this Article indicate the valuation figures both in
absolute and in relative terms on a block-by-block basis. "' For the group
as a whole the assessed valuation of land in the noncontrol group in-
creased between 1971 and 1973 much more rapidly than in the control
group; the difference was in excess of 12 percentage points. This is con-
siderably greater than the difference between the two groups for the
period from 1958 to 1966 when the just-completed rezoning of the non-
control group might have already affected the result. Although these
102. It was undesirable to use pre-1958 assessments because both the noncontrol and
control areas were rezoned CG in 1957; thus, earlier assessments would have introduced
additional variables.
The reassessments of 1971 were a precipitousi attempt to comply with the order of
the Supreme Court of Washington in Carkonen v. Williams, 76 Wash. 2d 617, 623,
458 P.2d 280, 284 (1969); see notes 81-83 smpra & accompanying text. This factor had
to be taken into account in evaluating our results.
103. Interview with Wilbur Furrand, Office of Assessor of King County, Feb. 19,
1976.
104. This practice has been instituted legislatively since the date of this study. "The
appraisal shall take into consideration restrictions such as zoning . . ." WASH. Rxv.
CoDE ANN. 5 84.40.030(1) (a) (Supp. 1974).
105. All of the land in the Regrade was originally platted for residential purposes and
is therefore legally described in terms of lots and blocks. On the other hand, the
assessor's files are kept on an economic unit basis by which an assessment unit cor-
responds to the smallest identified economic unit. As a result, an assessment unit may
represent a single lot, a portion of a lot, or two or more lots. In the control group,
in fact, one entire block is assessed as a unit. This should not distort the findings,
however, because the building on this block is only three stories high and does not
exhaust the limitations under the CG classification.
106. Appendix IV indicates the figures for the noncontrol group, and appendix V for
the control group. For purposes of identification we have numbered the blocks in
both groups consecutively in an arbitrary fashion.
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figures are not dramatic, they certainly are statistically significant, and
the resulting difference in annual taxes cannot be dismissed as de 77inimis.
The reappraisal figures for 1966 to 1971 show the opposite trend; the
control group increased at a faster rate, although by a smaller margin of
1.3 percentage points. However, the reappraisal of 1971 is nonrepresent-
ative because it is clear that the assessor in most cases simply doubled the
values to comply with the judicial mandate.10 7
Initially, these differences appeared less than would have been expected
from abstract reasoning. Further reflection, however, indicates that the
difference is exceedingly significant. In view of the abundance of unde-
veloped land in the Regrade and the sporadic and slow development of
the past two decades, values could not be expected to double or treble
overnight. 08 If, even under these circumstances, a significant difference
in assessed valuation has been found, there clearly is a relationship
between assessed value and changes in zoning." 9
RECOMMENDATIONS
The study of the Regrade proves empirically that upzoning is followed
by increases in assessment of the land values, which, in turn, translate
themselves into higher taxes."0 It remains to be determined whether any-
thing can or should be done about this effect of upzoning. The problem
is very broad, and a general approach would involve at least the reforma-
107. See notes 82-84 s-pra & accompanying text.
108. The study prepared as a background for the proposed plan for the Regrade
indicates that the available land on the Regrade, under the present zoning classification,
could not be utilized for 50 to 75 years. REGADE PLAN, supra note 91, at 6. If this
is correct, the rezoning should nor affect values and the results will become even more
significant.
109. This relationship is verified further by the, opinion of the Washington Board
of Tax Appeals in Zeta Psi Fraternity v. July, 1969 King County Board of Equalization,
No. 453 (Vash. Bd. of Tax App., April 24, 1970), setting thcl taxable value of a lot
located in another part of King County, As the opinion indicates, an upzoning for
high rise apartments, followed by no actual development in the area, resulted in sub-
stantial increases in assessment.
110. Typically, the real property tax in the United States is computed by applying a
certain percentage to the assessed value of the property to arrive at thel tax liability.
Therefore, the higher the assessed value, the higher the tax. The Washington statute
is representative. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 84.52.010 (Supp. 1974). For a discussion
of other models of real property taxation see, e.g., J. HiLBaRUN, REAL EsrATE TAXES
AND UPRBAN HoUsING 60-73 (1966). A discussion of the economic impact of property
taxes can be found in, e.g., D. NM-ER, ECO.NOMICS OF TE PROPERY TA x (1966);
G. PETERSON, A. SOLOMON, H. MADJID & W. APGAR, PROPaRT TAXES, HOUSING AND TE
CsnEs (1973).
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don or revision of the property tax system in general, and of assessment
procedures in particular."'
The concept of transferable development right may be used effectively
to bring a measure of justice to reassessments. Obviously, in a situation
such as the one disclosed by our study of the Regrade, however, the use
of transferable development rights would be inappropriate. The reassess-
ment does not correspond to real changes in value because there is an
oversupply of land and there is no demand for high rise building
sites on the Regrade. This simply indicates that the upzoning was either
premature or the result of mistake or overly optimistic projections." 2
In this respect the Regrade upzoning is not typical of most zoning
reclassifications." 3
In the usual situation in which the rezoning is followed or even pre-
ceded by an active demand for available land to be used in a more inten-
sive way, the transferable development rights may indeed provide
something akin to "fair compensation," as advanced by Professor Cos-
tonis. 1 4 The value of land, of course, is measured by its capacity to
produce an economic return. Other things being equal, if the land is
suitable for a more intensive use it should be able to generate a higher
111. G. PETERSON, A. SOLOMON, H. MADJID & W. APGAR, PROPERTY TAXES, HOUSING
AND THE CITIES 109-22 (1973); Comment, The Michigan Property Tax: Assessment,
Equalization, and Taxpayer Appeals, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 1397 (1971). Some suggestions
were made recently regarding the reformation of assessment procedures. See testimony
introduced in Hearings on S. 1255 Before the Subconn. on Intergovermnental Rela-
tions of the S. Comm. on Gover7mzent Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Confer-
ence Hour Discussions, in PROPERTY TAXATION USA 267 (R. Lindholm ed. 1967).
112. The Seattle World's Fair, staged in 1962, precipitated exaggerated expectations,
ultimately unfulfilled, of growth and development of the general area just beyond .the
Regrade. Interview with Falker Junglov, S.R.A., President, Seattle Chapter #20,
Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Feb. 23, 1976.
113. In many cases upzoning is initiated by property owners or purchasers who be-
lieve that the land is ready for a more intensive use. M. SELDIN, LAND INVESTMENT
146-48 (1975). See also Comment, Rezoning in New Orleans-Legal Requirements and
Decision-Making Criteria, 50 TUL. L. REv. 352 (1976).
Our findings may indicate disquieting possibilities. Hard pressed municipalities with
large deficits may be tempted to upzone marginal areas to raise the tax base artificially.
In the long run, such an attempt would be self-defeating.
114. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Acconmodatio.n Power: Antidotes for
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021 (1975). The
concerns of this Article, however, are not entirely the same as those of Professor
Costonis. He is primarily concerned with finding a pragmatic compromise between
effective control and acceptable costs to the public treasury. This Article, on the
other hand, is concerned with the mitigation of random incidents of benefits and




return and therefore command a higher price in the marketplace." 5 For
this reason, the price of unimproved land rises as it becomes ripe for
development. The problem faced by the property owner who has al-
ready improved his land at the prior, less intensive scale, is that although
technically his land has become more valuable, he has no practical way
of utilizing the increased value, at least in the short run," 6 and he is taxed
almost immediately on the increment in value through reassessment. A
new kind of equilibrium could be reached by a transfer of this unusable
development potential.
The new equilibrium presumably would aid the owner of developed
land while controlling the increase in market value of unimproved land.
It would permit the owner who has less intensive improvements to receive
some monetary or other economic equivalent for his added development
potential and to avoid an increased tax burden. After parting with his
development rights he should not be assessed on .the basis of the rede-
velopment potential.117 At the same time this availability of incremental
development potential should have a dampening effect on the increase
in the market values of the available unimproved land because a purchaser
who could construct the same type of improvement on less land by
buying or leasing the development rights of other property owners
would not be likely to pay the same kind of premium for the land if this
option were unavailable. The type of equilibrium achieved would depend
on the relative availability of unimproved land and transferable develop-
ment rights, on the willingness of owners to sell or lease, on the parties'
understanding of the market, and on the degree of sophistication em-
ployed in negotiating the details of the transfers.""'
115. For one discussion of the mechanics, see M. SELDIN, LAND INvEsTmENT 46-48
(1975); cf. Gramm & Ekelund, Land-Use Planning: The Market Alternative, 43 AP-
PRAISAL J. 562, 566-69 (1975). Although these works are illustrative, the authors of-this
Article do not endorse the conclusions.
116. In the long run the owner may achieve a new equilibrium, either by up-
grading his improvements, if this can be done, or by substituting new ones. This can
be done indirectly by a sale to one who will improve the property.
117. This would seem to follow from the logic of the transaction. See Opinion of
Wash. Att'y Gen., No. 53-55-285, July 16, 1954 (easements). It would be desirable,
however, to include a specific provision to this effect in any enabling legislation. This
provision would not result in any loss of revenue to the municipality, because the
acquired development rights should then be assessed as part of the parcel to which
they have been transferred.
118. One of the principal problems in this area would be the question of the degree
to which the prospective transferors could weigh the relative benefits of an immediate
financial return, coupled with the avoidance of property tax increases, against the
prospective loss of the development potential increment.
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The transferability of development rights should not be included in
the same ordinance that upzones the area. The transferability issue should
be decided separately and should predate the upzoning ordinance to
foreclose the argument that the municipality provided compensation
because its zoning action constituted a "taking" within the meaning of
the fifth amendment or appropriate state constitutional provisions. Al-
though the law at present makes it quite clear that in most cases changes
in zoning will not constitute a compensable taking," 9 the inclusion of
transferability in zoning ordinances may suggest an attempt to compen-
sate and might bring into question the adequacy of that compensation.120
The ordinance authorizing development right transfer should estab-
lish specific machinery to implement these transfers. The Chicago Plan
calls for a development rights bank that creates an independent source
of revenue from the sale of these rights and thus avoids dependency upon
the general revenue of the city.121 The direct market approach may be
preferable to keep transaction costs low. 12 2 The transfer could be accom-
plished by lease as well as by sale, or, in the alternative, by determinable
fee. The lease or determinable fee approach may be preferable; when
the economic life of the improvement ends, the development right would
revert to the original parcel for reuse or reassignment. This would in-
crease the flexibility of the system. In this connection, the possible prob-
lems such as those raised by Newport Associates, Inc. v. SoloW123 should
be kept in mind. Full payment at the time of transfer would avoid the
very difficult problems of enforcement of periodic payments on default.
The process could be encouraged further by the provision of tax
benefits. Since the United States repealed the stamp tax on deeds, 124
119. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
120. Cf. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352
N.Y.S. 2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Tudor Parks) and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 2353 (N.Y.S. Ct., Feb. 25, 1975) (Grand Central Station).
In both of these decisions the transfer was offered ad hoc to a specific location. It is
interesting to speculate on the result if the right to transfer were more liberal and
granted pursuant to a general policy.
121. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-48.2-1A(3) (1971). For a discussion, see
J. CosroNis, supra note 21, at 52-54.
122. For an interesting proposal, see Rose, A Proposal for the Separation and Mar-
ketability of Development Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL Es-.
LJ. 635, 651-52 (1974). See also Shales, The Economics of Development Rights
Transfers, 42 APPRAISAL J. 526, 529 (1974).
123. 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
931 (1973). See notes 37-45 supra & accompanying text.
124. Irr. Rav. Cona op 1954, § 4361. See Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 § 401(b),
Pub. L. No. 89-44, 79 Stat. 136, 148.
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states have generally adopted such taxes.125 In addition, some states
impose a sales tax on land transfers,1 26 and the practice is likely to spread.
If transfers of development rights were exempted from such taxes, the
device would become more attractive. This in turn might be expected to
further cushion the swings in value of rezoned land.
For the system to have any appreciable impact or chance of success,
the area of transfer must be sufficiently wide. In this context limitations
of transfer to neighboring parcels only, such as those imposed by New
York or Seattle, 27 are counterproductive. This problem could be solved
easily by permitting the transfer of development rights in any contiguous
area in which densities and bulk are regulated under the FAR principle
with a FAR allotment of at least 10:1. This would eliminate any impli-
cations or fears of favoritism or direct barter between the municipality
and a particular landowner to achieve ends which otherwise might be
precluded . 28 To forestall construction of structures of monstrous di-
mensions, however, the right to use acquired development rights may
be qualified by providing absolute height or coverage limitations or by
creating a ceiling of a predetermined multiple of the FAR allotment for
the acquiring parcel. These limitations should be flexible enough to adapt
to local conditions. As in bonus or incentive zoning plans,' 2 the use of
the acquired development rights also could be qualified by the require-
ment of specified public amenities.
There is, of course, no certainty that these suggestions will be success-
ful if implemented. On the other hand, there are no compelling reasons
why they should not be tested; if they fail, society would lose nothing,
but if they succeed, a measure of fairness would be introduced into the
effects of upzoning. The market reaction to an availability of transferable
125. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 201.02 (Supp. 1975) (30 cents for each $100.00 of
value); MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 207.501 to .513 (Supp. 1975) (55 cents for each
$500.00 of value); WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. §§ 82.20.005-.070 (1962) (50 cents for each
$500.00 of value).
126. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3283-3292 (1964) (tax equal to one percent
of sales price); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.45.010-.120 (1970) (tax not to exceed
one percent of sales price to be imposed by counties). All counties have imposed the
tax; 1 CCH State Tax Rep., Wash 56-541 to -542 (1969).
127. NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RSOLuTION art. I, ch. 2, § 12-10 (1971); SEArrLE
ZONING & PLANNING CODE § 26.34.080(a).
128. One such undesirable transfer was the lease by New York City of excess FAR
allotments for the appellate division courthouse to the owner of an adjoining parcel.
See Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 358-61
(1972).
129. See J. CosToN s, supra note 21 at 28-39; Comment, Boms or Incentive Zoning-
Legal Implications, 21 SYRt cusE L. REv. 895 (1970).
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rights will affect both sides of the ledger, dampening the exaggerated
effects of the rezoning. On the one hand, transferable development rights
should help to alleviate the plight of the property owner who has contri-
buted to the orderly development of the community by improving his
property to the extent permissible under the prior classification.' At the
same time, .although transferable development rights will not eliminate
the windfall benefits to those who hold unimproved land, the extent of
such benefits should be depressed because those who want to purchase
land for development into economically productive units would have
an additional source of supply.131
This suggestion is modest; it is offered as a potentially worthwhile con-
tribution toward the alleviation of some spillover effects of the zoning
process. At the same time, the proposal should not be dismissed out of
hand because it is modest. The problems encountered in land use man-
agement are far too complex to be subject to easy and all-encompassing
solutions. A more promising method is a pragmatic approach to fashion-
ing workable solutions to smaller and manageable segments, particularly
when the proposed approaches pose fewer possibilities of creating new
problems of their own.
CONCLUSION
There is considerable disillusionment with zoning. This was inevitable
as a reaction to optimistic expectations of those who nurtured it in its
infancy." 2 Perhaps, however, there is another, deeper reason for this
dissatisfaction. Zoning is by no means the only or the most important
tool of land use planning."3' It has done certain things very well,"- but
130. Although this may require the owner to try to discount the future, he is better
off because, at the very least, he is given a choice where he had none before. More-
over, any decision to sell a property interest realistically involves an element of dis-
counting the future.
131. These suggestions will not satisfy those who believe that these incremental
values should accrue to the public treasury. This position is, however, controversial and
no satisfactory tools have been developed to implement it. See Babcock & Bosselman,
Conflicts in Land Use, in ENVIRONMENT: A Naw Focus FOR LAND-UsE PLANNING 143,
145 (D. McAllister ed. 1973); Comment, Betterment Recovery: A Financial Proposal for
Sounder Land Use Planning, 3 YALE REV. OF L. & Soc. ACTION 192 (1973); cf. Hagman,
Windfalls for Wipeouts, 44 APPRAISAL J. 69 (1976).
132. E.g., 1 J. ME-zENBAUm, LAW OF ZONING 60-68 (2d ed. 1955); 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING
LAW AND PRAcncE §§ 1-12 to -15 (2d ed. 1953).
133. For a short list of other tools, see Bartke & Shinn, Land Use Planning in Iran-
A Critical Survey, 20 A.VAYNE L. REv. 87, 113 (1973).
134. Id. at 105-09. See also Rueter, Externalities in Urban Property Markets: An
Empirical Test of the Zoning Ordinance of Pittsburgh, 16 J. LAW & EcoN. 313, 337
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this does not mean that it can do everything. Some of the dissatisfaction
with zoning arises because it has been employed to do too many disparate
things. Attempts to use zoning to preserve a wildlife sanctuary, 3 5 to
keep avant garde architecture out of a neighborhood, 3 6 to silence a pro-
test against the taxing policies of the community, 3 7 to keep X-rated
movie theaters out of residential neighborhoods, 38 to preserve a parking
lot,13 9 or to relieve pressures on a sewage treatment plant 40 simply
stretched the tool beyond the breaking point. It is much better to do a
few things well than to try to do many things badly.
Land use management becomes ever more complex in an increasingly
interdependent society. The diverse problems involved will not be solved
by simplistic approaches.14 1 Thus, the proposition that regulatory powers,
already stretched to the breaking point, can do the job virtually by
themselves' 4 2 will not hold true. Whether this is because of constitutional
(1973). After this Article was written, the results of a study based on data from the
Boston Metropolitan area were published and indicate a statistically significant relation-
ship between the value of single-family residential property and zoning. Stull, Com-
munity Environment, Zoning, and the Market Value of Single-Fmnnily Homes, 18
J. LAw & EcoN. 535 (1975).
135. Morris County Land. Imp. Co. v. Township of Parsippeny-Troy Hills, 40 N.J.
539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (property zoned to preclude any use other than as a hunting
and fishing preserve or a wildlife sanctuary, partly at the instance of a conservation
foundation that owned land in the same area).
136. State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W. 2d 305, 307 (Mo. 1970) (architec-
tural board of controls prevented construction of a pyramid shaped "monstrosity of
grostesque design" among Colonial, French Provincial and English homes).
137. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dis-
missed sub nora. Stover v. New York, 375 U.S. 42 (1963) (zoning ordinance amended
to prohibit clotheslines in front yards as means to get rid of rags and scarecrows hung
as protest over local taxes).
138. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), reVd
sub nora. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 44 U.S.L.W. 4999 (U.S. June 24, 1976)
(ordinance prohibiting movie theatres exhibiting X-rated movies from being closer than
1,000 feet apart in residential areas).
139. Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517
(1954) (86,000 square foot parcel in front of railroad station in suburban community,
previously used for parking, rezoned "designated parking district" to prohibit all uses
except parking).
140. Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244
N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969) (downzoning a parcel to prevent the construction
of a high-rise apartment building because of inadequacy of the sewage treatment plant
in the municipality).
141. The truth of this becomes apparent in many contexts. See, e.g., Verbit, The
Urban Transportation Problem, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 368 (1975), which subjects the
problem to a searching analysis and suggests that solutions must combine several ap-
proaches, including land use planning tools.
142. Donaldson, Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land-The Need to Purge
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restraints, or because of the belief within the community that justice is
not being done, is irrelevant. By the same token, the marketplace alone
cannot cope with the issues presented by land use decisions, 43 although
it is true that many resolutions are better made by the marketplace. At-
tempts to provide new mechanisms for internalization of harmful spill-
over effects through private agreements and revamped nuisance rules,
coupled with the imposition of a new layer of bureaucracy, are not
necessarily going to be an improvement.' The principal fault with
these proposals is that they try to create universally applicable systems.
Such systems are unattainable.
There should be a move from extreme and doctrinaire positions to
a much more pragmatic approach. The sterile debate about the level of
government that is best suited to the task has long since run its course;145
in the abstract, there is no such level. On the contrary, the approach to
land use management should be based on the nature of the problems.
146
Natural Law Constraints form the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187
(1974); Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid to Ranapo: New Directions in Land Develop-
ment Controls, I HOFSrRA L. REV. 56 (1973). But see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &
J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 302-09 (1973) (discussion of the concept of "compensable
regulations").
143. This, of course, fully is realized by, sophisticated advocates of the market ap-
proach, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 761-79; Stroup & Baden, Externality, Property
Rights, and the Management of our National Forests, 16 J. LAW & EcoN. 303 (1973).
But see Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 71 (1970). Compare
Gramm & Ekelund, Land-Use Plaming: The Market Alternative, 43 APPRAISAL J. 562
(1975), with Reynolds & Reynolds, Winds of Change, 43 APPRAISAL J. 554 (1975). For
an empirical study and the conclusion that some form of zoning may be desirable and
economically efficient, see Rueter, Externalities in Urban Property Markets: An Em-
pirical Test of the Zoning Ordinance of Pittsburgh, 16 J. LAW & EcoN. 313 (1973).
144. See, e.g., Professor Ellickson's suggestions in this respect. Ellickson, supra note 2,
at 719-61; for a critique, see Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Acconnodation
Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLuM. L. REv.
1021, 1026-32 (1975).
145. See, e.g., Symposium, Restructuring Metropolitan Area Government, 58 GEO.
L.J. 663 (1970).
146. See, e.g., Bartke & Shinn, Land Use Planning in Iran-A Critical Survey, 20
WAYNE L. REV. 87, 110-11 (1973) (recommendations based on experiences in a country
where all planning decisions are made centrally, although decentralization is necessary
to some extent).
There is increasing evidence of such a subject matter approach, e.g., Tahoe Regional
Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Star. 360 (1969) (interstate compact dealing
with Lake Tahoe drainage area). See Brown v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 385 F. Supp.
1128 (D. Nev. 1973); People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480,
487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971). Similarly, the San Francisco Bay Conservation
and Development Commission was created to deal with the entire San Francisco Bay.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66600-60.1 (Supp. 1975). See Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San
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Similarly, the various legal tools available should be used only in those
contexts in which they can perform efficiently.14 7 An attempt to ex-
pand them into new areas in which they do not fit is in most cases
doomed to disappointment and results only in discrediting the tools. It
is with these broader considerations in mind that this study was under-
taken and these findings are presented. This Article does not offer
panaceas to urban ills; rather, a workable approach to solving one spe-
cific land use problem is suggested, and even if the problem discussed in
this Article may be relatively minor, it should not continue to be
ignored.
Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970);
People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n v. Town of Emeryville,
69 Cal. 2d 533, 446 P.2d 790, 72 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1968). An agency to plan for the entire
Adirondack Park area was established by the Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y.
ExEc. CODE §§ 800-819 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See Note, Preserving Scenic Areas:
The Adirondack Land Use Program, 84 YALE LJ. 1705 (1975). Cf. Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 18 (1975).
147. Thus, Professor Hagman quoted a California planning official to the effect that
transferable development rights work well only in law review articles. Hagman,
Windfalls for Wipeouts, 44 APPRAISAL J. 69, 81 (1976). This may result from an
attempt to make a transferable development right do too many things. These rights
may be very useful in their primary role, permitting area-wide density controls and
more imaginative urban design. They may also be useful in the context discussed in
this Article, particularly if the transferability is over a large enough area and transac-
don costs are low. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether they can be expected
to perform well in many other contexts.
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APPENDIX II
Schematic map of the central portion of Seattle showing the
relationship of the Denny Regrade to the downtown area.
Source: Department of Community Development, City of Seattle,
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